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Abstract The present study analyses the dynamics of a nonlinear Cournot duopoly 
with managerial delegation and bounded rational players. Problems concerning 
strategic delegation (based on relative performance evaluations) have recently 
received in depth attention in both the theoretical and empirical industrial economics 
literatures. In this paper, we take a dynamic view of this problem and assume that the 
owners of both firms hire a manager and delegate output decisions to him. Each 
manager receives a fixed salary plus a bonus offered in a publicly observable contract. 
The bonus entitled to the manager hired by the owner of every firm is based on 
relative (profit) performance. Managers of both firms may collude or compete. In such 
a context, we find, in either cases of collusion and low degree of competition, that 
synchronised dynamics takes place. However, when the degree of competition 
increases the dynamics can undergo symmetry-breaking bifurcations that may cause 
relevant global phenomena. In particular, on-off intermittency and blow-out 
bifurcations are observed for several parameter values. Moreover, coexistence of 
attractors may also occur. The global behaviour of the noninvertible map is 
investigated through the study of the transverse Lyapunov exponent and the folding 
action of the critical curves of the map. These phenomena are impossible under profit 
maximisation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The attempt of inquiring about firms’ objectives different from pure profit 
maximisation dates back at least to Baumol (1958). Indeed, when ownership and 
management are separated between each other (see Fama and Jensen, 1983), it seems 
reasonable to assume that managers are driven by motives different from the 
maximisation of profits, so that owners may try to motivate them through adequate 
incentive contracts to get a competitive advantage in the market (see Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990, for empirical evidence). This is the case of large companies, where 
governance is at all different than that of (small) perfectly competitive firms. Indeed, 
as clearly pointed out by Miller and Pazgal (2002, p. 51): “The complexity of 
managerial decisions and the clear separation between ownership and management 
are frequently cited as the main obstacles to the achievement of true profit 
maximization.” 
    The strategic use of managerial incentive contracts has been introduced in the 
theoretical literature by the pioneering papers of Vickers (1985), Fershtman (1985), 
Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) (VFJS henceforth). According to them, 
owners have the opportunity to compensate their managers with a bonus based on a 
weighted sum of profits and sales (“sales delegation”), in order to direct him to a more 
aggressive behaviour on the market.1 Moreover, a more recent literature argues that 
managerial delegation can also allow for the possibility of incentive contracts based on 
market shares delegation and relative (profit) performance evaluations, see Salas 
Fumas (1992), Miller and Pazgal (2002), Jansen et al. (2007), van Witteloostuijn et al. 
(2007) and Jansen et al. (2009). In the latter case, the general idea is that in oligopoly 
models, the performance of every firm (profit) is evaluated in comparison with the 
performance of competitors. 
    In particular, managerial contracts based on relative performance are of particular 
importance, as stressed by both the empirical and theoretical literatures. Examples 
are provided by Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), as 
regards empirical evidence, while Salas Fumas (1992) and Miller and Pazgal (2002), 
offer theoretical attempts on this issue. Relative profit delegation contracts are 
essentially established in such a way that every manager receives a fixed salary plus a 
bonus offered in a publicly observable contract, which represents the incentive scheme 
that drives her behaviour on the market. The bonus is computed as a weighted sum of 
profits of the firm where the manager is delegated and profits of the rival, where the 
weight denotes the manager’s attitude (degree) to collude or compete with the 
manager delegated in the other firm. However, the literature above mentioned 
concentrates exclusively on the study of static two-stage games played between owners 
and managers, and compares the results (output) of an economy where managerial 
delegation exists with respect to the standard case of profit maximisation. 
    In addition, there exists a burgeoning literature on dynamic oligopolies (see Bischi 
et al., 2010), that analyses several aspects of local and global dynamic events 
(stability) that can indeed arise in the study of this class of models. 
    The novelty of the present paper is the introduction of managerial delegation 
schemes based on relative (profits) performance in a dynamic nonlinear duopoly game 
à la Cournot (1838), in both cases of collusion and competition between managers. As 
                                                 
1 Indeed, in a relevant work, Grossman and Stiglitz (1977) attempt to unify the theories of conventional 
profit maximisation objective of firms and the managerial literature. 
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is known, a duopolistic market with standard linear demand and cost functions is 
stable if expectations of every firm are “naïve” (i.e. both firms expect that the current 
period rival’s production equal that of the previous period), as shown by Theocharis 
(1960). However, if expectations of one or both firms are of the type of those recently 
suggested by the dynamic oligopoly literature, and, in particular, they follow the 
myopic rule introduced by Dixit (1986), i.e. firms are assumed to be “bounded rational” 
and increase/decrease outputs in the current period according to the information given 
by marginal profits in the last period, then the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a 
Cournot duopoly with linear or isoelastic demand functions can be destabilised, either 
through a flip bifurcation or Neimark-Sacker bifurcation, when the intensity of the 
reaction of every firm to the strategy played by the rival becomes high and, in 
particular, complex dynamics can also occur (see, e.g., Puu, 1991, 1998; Kopel, 1996; 
Bischi et al., 1998; Bischi et al., 1999; Tramontana, 2010). 
    However, despite the widespread use of managerial incentive contracts à la VFJS, a 
stability analysis of a nonlinear dynamic duopoly with quantity competition and 
relative performance has not been so far tackled on. The present studies aims to fill 
this gap by assuming homogeneous players with bounded rationality. The dynamic 
system in our model is therefore characterised by a two-dimensional symmetric map. 
In this context, we study the cases of both collusion and competition between 
managers. It is interesting to note that the introduction of an objective function (i.e., 
the manager bonus based on a contract that includes relative performance evaluations 
as an incentive device) different from firms’ profit causes relevant dynamic 
phenomena, which are usually observed in models with heterogeneous players. 
    Indeed, we recall that in a classical profit-maximising dynamic Cournot game with 
linear demand and cost functions, the dynamic evolution becomes symmetric after few 
iterations, and this in turn implies that synchronised dynamics are governed by a one-
dimensional map, which summarises the common behaviour of the two players. In 
contrast with this, in a managerial delegation game with relative profit incentive 
contracts and homogeneous players with identical production costs, we obtain results 
similar to those found by Bischi et al. (1998, 1999) in models with heterogeneous 
players with different production costs. In particular, in the case of competition 
between managers, we can observe: (i) symmetry-breaking bifurcations. Though the 
two players are homogeneous because of the assumptions of identical production costs 
and managers’ attitudes, they can either coordinate their behaviours only after a very 
long transient (on-off intermittency), or non-coordinate themselves in the long run 
(blow out); (ii) coexistence of several attractors and their basins of attraction. 
    In the opposite case of collusion, we find that when a chaotic set exists on the 
diagonal, the dynamics tend to synchronise more rapidly in such a case. From a 
technical point of view, there exists a threshold value of collusion beyond which the 
attractor from being weak stable (i.e., stable in the Milnor sense) becomes Lyapunov 
stable. In other words, collusion makes coordination between managers delegated in 
both firms easier, while competition is responsible of dramatically more complex 
dynamic events. We will investigate these phenomena through the study of the 
transverse stability of the diagonal, where symmetric trajectories may take place, 
while also using the critical curves technique to delimitate areas of non-synchronised 
dynamics and study global bifurcations of the basins of attraction. 
    The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we build on a 
Cournot duopoly with relative performance and concentrate on the market stage of the 
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game where managers make decisions on the quantity to be produced. Section 3 
introduces expectations and studies both the local and global properties of the 
dynamic system. In particular, Section 3 shows in either cases of collusion and low 
degree of competition between managers, that synchronised dynamics takes place. 
However, when the degree of competition increases, the dynamics may undergo 
symmetry breaking which can indeed cause relevant global phenomena. In particular, 
on-off intermittency, blow-out bifurcations are observed for several parameter values. 
Moreover, coexistence of attractors can also occur. 
 
2. The model 
 
The model is outlined in accordance with the pioneering papers by VFJS. In 
particular, as regards the assumptions of both the normalised inverse demand and 
manager’s bonus, we strictly follow the structure of the recent papers by van 
Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) and Jansen et al. (2009). 
    We consider a Cournot duopoly for a single homogeneous product with normalised 
linear inverse demand given by Qp −=1 ,2 where p  is the market price of product Q , 
which is the sum of outputs 1q  and 2q  produced by firm 1 and firm 2 , respectively. 
The (average and marginal) cost of producing an additional unit of output is 10 << c  
for every firm. This hypothesis implies that firm i  produces through a production 
function with constant (marginal) returns to labour, that is ii Lq = , where iL  
represents the labour force employed by the i th firm (see, e.g., Correa-López and 
Naylor, 2004). 
    We assume that owners of both firms hire a manager and delegate output decisions 
to him. Each manager receives a fixed salary plus a bonus offered in a publicly 
observable contract. In particular, the bonus entitled to the manager hired by firm 
{ }2,1=i  is given by the normalised linear combination jiiiU Π−Π= β , where 
( ) ii qcp −=Π  denotes profits of i th firm (i.e., the firm where the manager is delegated) 
and 11 <<− iβ  denotes the manager’s attitude (“type”) and captures the relative 
weight of profits of firm i  ( iΠ ) with respect to those obtained by the rival ( jΠ ) in 
manager i ’s objective.3 Negative values of iβ  imply that the owner of firm i  is 
interested in collusive behaviour with manager of firm j  (collusion).4 Positive values 
of iβ  describe the case under which the manager of the i th firm is more appreciated 
                                                 
2
 Note that the standard inverse demand QBAp ′−=′  can be normalised by using App /′=  and 
( )QABQ ′= / . 
3
 This formulation of the manager’s bonus is equivalent to assuming the existence of weight w  attached 
to her own profits ( iΠ ) and weight w−1  attached to the difference between her own profits and those 
obtained by the rival ( ji Π−Π ), where 20 << w  (see Miller and Pazgal, 2002). Indeed, 
( )( ) ( ) jiijiijiiiii wwwU Π−Π=Π−−Π=Π−Π−−Π= β11 , where ii w−= 1:β . We can reasonably 
avoid to take 1>iβ  into account, as the manager of firm i  would be more concerned with profits of the 
rival than with profits of her own firm in such a case. 
4 It is important to note that in a context without managerial delegation, problems concerning partial 
cooperation in oligopolies have been studied, amongst others, by Cyert and DeGroot (1973) in a static 
model, and by Kopel and Szidarovszky (2006) in a dynamic model. 
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by the owner the higher are profits of the firm where she is delegated (competition). 
Given the assumption of uniform manager’s type βββ == ji , the bonus of manager of 
firm i  can be expressed as ( )( )jii qqcQU β−−−= 1 . This is the rule that drives the 
behaviour of managers in this simple economy. We note that the relative weight β  is 
assumed to be (i) exogenously given for each single manager and, (ii) not chosen by the 
owner of firm i  to maximise profits. This because the main purpose of the present 
study is to inquire about both the local and global dynamic effects of β  in a nonlinear 
Cournot oligopoly. Indeed, in the industrial economics literature, it is usual to assume 
that iβ  is an endogenous variable chosen by the owner of firm i  to maximise profits in 
the contract-stage of the game (i.e., the stage played by owners and managers to 
choose the size of weight iβ  in the managerial contract), while being taken as given by 
managers in the market-stage of the game (i.e., the stage at which the manager makes 
decisions about the quantity to be produced – under Cournot competition) (see Miller 
and Pazgal, 2002; Jansen et al., 2009).5 
    Therefore, in order to find the equilibrium in the market stage played by manager 1 
and manager 2 , we compute the following system of first-order conditions, obtained 
from the maximisation of managers’ objectives ( iU ) with respect to the quantity 
produced by the firm where each of them is delegated, by taking β  as given, that is: 
 ( ) 01210 21
1
1
=−−−−⇔=
∂
∂
cqq
q
U β , (1.1) 
 ( ) 01210 12
2
2
=−−−−⇔=
∂
∂
cqq
q
U β . (1.2) 
    The solutions of the Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2) for 1q  and 2q  respectively, define the best-
reply of player i , that is the manager hired by firm i , given the strategy played by the 
rival, that is the manager hired by firm ij ≠ . Then, we find the following reaction 
functions: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]cqqq −−−= β11
2
1
221 , (2.1) 
 ( ) ( )[ ]cqqq −−−= β11
2
1
112 . (2.2) 
 
3. Expectations and dynamics 
 
In this section we introduce dynamic elements into the Cournot duopoly with relative 
performance studied in the previous section. In order to do so, we have first to inquire 
(given the objective function of every manager) about the quantity iq  that the i th firm 
will produce in the future depending on expectations that the manager delegated in 
such a firm has about the quantity that will be produced by the rival in such a period. 
Second, we need to specify the type of expectations formation mechanism of both 
managers. Third, we study both the local and global stability of the dynamic system. 
    As is known, the Nash equilibrium in a duopoly game with quantity competition 
and standard linear demand and cost functions is stable if expectations of each firm 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, iβ  can be chosen as the solution of a Nash bargaining played between both the owner 
and manager in the contract-stage of the game (see, e.g., van Witteloostuijn et al., 2007). 
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are of the “naïve” type (i.e., each firm expects that the output produced today by the 
rival equals the output produced in the previous period), as shown by Theocharis 
(1960). The use of static expectations, however, has been criticised because it 
overestimates the importance of past values. Indeed, the rational expectations6 
revolution, which has initiated in macroeconomics with the works by, amongst others, 
Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1973), prescribes that (i) agents form their 
expectations on the value take on a certain variable in the future by using in the most 
efficient way the information they have, and (ii) the expectations of a single economic 
agent on a specific variable (i.e., the subjective probability distribution of the events) 
tend to be distributed in accordance with the prediction of the prevailing economic 
theory (i.e., the objective probability distribution of the events). However, also the 
hypothesis of rational expectations has been subject to some criticisms (see, e.g., 
Burmeister, 1980), because it seems to overestimate the ability of agents to predict the 
behaviour of prices and quantities. 
    The burgeoning interest in nonlinear dynamic models has therefore renewed the 
interest in the use of expectations formation mechanisms at all different from the 
scheme of rational expectations. Indeed, as claimed by Agliari, Chiarella and Gardini 
(2006, p. 527), “When one takes into account the fact that nonlinear dynamical 
systems can produce dynamic paths that are not so regular and predictable, one of the 
major arguments against adaptive expectations does not seem so strong.”, because 
linear models represent an approximation of nonlinear models (see, amongst others, 
Chiarella, 1986, 1990; Bischi et al., 2010).7 
    Therefore, if expectations formation mechanisms of one or both firms on the 
quantity produced by the rival in the future are those of the type suggested in the 
most part of the recent dynamic oligopoly literature, i.e. firms are assumed the have 
bounded rational expectations (see Simon, 1957, for the notion of bounded rationality), 
and then increase/decrease outputs in the future according to a certain degree or speed 
of adjustment depending on information given by the marginal profit in the current 
period, then the Nash equilibrium in a standard Cournot duopoly with may be 
destabilised when the speed of adjustment of each firm’s output is fairly high and, in 
particular, complex dynamics can also be observed, as shown by, e.g., Puu, 1991, 1998; 
Kopel, 1996; Agiza and Elsadany, 2003, 2004; Zhang et al., 2007; Tramontana, 2010). 
    We now turn to the study of the dynamic duopoly with relative performance. Let 
( )tqi  be firm i ’s quantity produced at time ,...2,1,0=t . Then, ( )1+tqi  is obtained through 
the following optimisation programmes: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1,maxarg1 2111 1 +=+ tqtqUtq etq , (3.1) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tqqqUtq etq 2122 ,1maxarg1 2 +=+ . (3.2) 
where ( )1+tq ie  represents the quantity that the rival (i.e., the firm where manager j  
is delegated) today (time t ) expects will be produced at time 1+t  by the firm where 
manager i  is delegated. In the present study, we assume that every manager has 
bounded rational expectations about the quantity to be produced in the future by the 
                                                 
6 See Muth (1961) for the notion of rational expectations. 
7 From the consumer perspective in a microeconomic model, Naimzada and Tramontana (2010) show 
that the behaviour of bounded rational consumers that learn from the past can converge in the long run 
to the rational behaviour as regards the optimal choice of the consumption bundle. For an analysis of 
macroeconomic models with bounded rationality, see Sargent (1993). 
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rival, i.e. players have homogeneous expectations.8 Therefore, each player uses 
information on the current manager’s objective in such a way to increase or decrease 
the quantity produced at time 1+t  depending on whether manager i ’s marginal bonus 
(i.e., ( )tqU ii ∂∂ / ) is either positive or negative. Following the general idea by Dixit 
(1986),9 we now adopt the adjustment mechanism (of quantities over time) proposed by 
Bischi and Naimzada (2000) in a discrete-time oligopoly model. Then, production at 
time 1+t  of the i th bounded rational player follows the rule 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )tq
U
tqtqtq
i
i
iiii ∂
•∂
+=+ α1 , (4) 
where 0>iα  is a coefficient that captures the speed of adjustment of firm i ’s quantity 
with respect to a marginal change in the manager’s bonus when iq  varies at time t , 
and ( )tqiiα  is the intensity of the reaction of every bounded rational player. Therefore, 
through Eq. (4), and using the marginal bonus as given by Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2), the 
system that characterises the dynamics of this simple duopoly game with quantity 
competition can easily be expressed as follows: 
 ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ]

−−−−+=′
−−−−+=′
=
cqqqqq
cqqqqq
qqTT βα
βα
121
121
:,
12222
21111
21 . (5) 
where ααα == 21  and iq′  is the unit-time advancement of variable iq  (used to simplify 
notation). For any given value of α  and knowing that 11 <<− β , from Eq. (5) it is easy 
to see that when 0>β  (competition), a rise in β  has the straightforward effect to 
increase the marginal bonus of manager i  (of an amount exactly equal to the quantity 
of goods and services produced by the rival), and then to raise the quantity produced 
by firm i  at time 1+t . Alternatively, when 0<β  (collusion) a rise in the absolute 
value of β  reduces the marginal bonus of manager i , and then it tends to reduce the 
quantity produced by firm i  at time 1+t . For this reason β  plays an important role in 
determining the dynamic properties of the symmetric map, while being responsible of 
the existence of local and global phenomena which are usually observed in asymmetric 
maps (e.g., different production costs, see Bischi et al., 1998). From a mathematical 
point of view, it is relevant to stress the presence of the parameter β  (which we recall 
it represents the relative degree of collusion or competition between managers in our 
context) which multiplies the mixed term 21 qq  of map T . This implies that, different 
from Bischi et al. (1998) and related literature, by changing β , we can indeed vary the 
weight of mixed term without affecting the pure quadratic terms 2iq , with { }2,1=i . 
Moreover, when 1=β  the map becomes totally uncoupled. 
    The (symmetric) map defined by Eq. (5) is characterised by the existence of four 
fixed points: ( )0,00 =E , 




 −
=
2
1
,01
cE  and 




 −
= 0,
2
1
2
cE  located on the invariant 
coordinate axes,10 and 
                                                 
8
 There are several examples in the economic literature on nonlinear dynamic duopolies where players 
are assumed to have homogeneous expectations (see, e.g., Kopel, 1996; Agiza, 1999; Bischi and 
Naimzada, 2000; Bischi and Kopel, 2001; Agliari et al., 2005; Agliari, Gardini and Puu, 2006). 
9 We note that Dixit (1986) introduces a time-adjustment mechanism of quantities in a continuous-time 
Cournot model. 
10 Testing for the invariance of axis i  is straightforward: if we start from 0=iq , we get 0=′iq . Thus, 
L. Fanti, L. Gori, M. Sodini 
 8 
 





−
−
−
−
= ββ 3
1
,
3
1* ccE , (6) 
which represents the unique pure strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium for this duopoly 
game with relative performance, where *2
*
1
* qqq == .11 Following Bischi et al. (1998), 
we note that even if the axes are not economically meaningful, they play an important 
role in the determining the boundary of the basins of attraction of the finite distance 
attractors. In Section 3.2 we will investigate this question in depth. 
    One important characteristic of the map defined by Eq. (5) is that diagonal 
( ){ }2121 :, qqqq ==∆  is an invariant manifold, that is ∆⊆∆)(T . In fact, map T  has a 
symmetric form, so that it does change if variables 1q  and 2q  are swapped, that is 
TSST oo = , where ( ) ( )1221 ,,: qqqqS → . This implies that if the two players start with 
the same initial conditions ( ) ( )00 21 qq =  the dynamics lies on ∆  for every t . In this case, 
the behaviour of the dynamic system is described by the restriction of map T  on ∆ , 
and the synchronised trajectories (i.e., ( ) ( )tqtq 21 = , for every t ) are governed by 
∆→∆∆ :T , where 
 ( )[ ]cqqqqT −−−+=′∆ βα 31: . (7) 
This map is conjugated to the logistic map 
 ( )zzz −=′ 1µ . (8) 
by the linear transformation 
 
( )
( ) z
cq βα
α
−
−+
=
3
11
: . (9) 
with ( )c−+= 11: αµ . It follows that the dynamics on ∆  can be obtained from the well 
known behaviour of the standard logistic map by a homeomorphism. The main 
properties of ∆T  are listed in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Let β−
−
=
∗
3
1 cq  be the unique interior fixed point of the map. If 
( ) 210 <−< cα , then ∗q  is asymptotically stable and its basin of attraction is given by 
( )
( ) 




−
−+
βα
α
3
11
,0 c . When ( ) 21 =− cα , *q  undergoes a flip bifurcation, and for 
( ) 612 <−< cα , an attracting cycle of period two exists around ∗q . Starting from 
( ) 21 =− cα , an increase in ( )c−1α  causes other flip bifurcations according to which 
attracting cycles of periods n2,...,8,4  appear. 
 
Proof. We refer to Devaney (1989) for details of the proof. 
 
To be more precise, for ( ) 11 −>− ∗υα c  ( 57.3≅∗υ ) the fate of a generic trajectory 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the dynamics lies on axis i  for every t . 
11 We note that equilibrium profits are given by 
( ) ( )
( ) 03
11
2
2
* >
−
−−
=Π=Π=Π β
βc
ji  for every 
11 <<− β . 
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starting in the interval 
( )
( ) 




−
−+
βα
α
3
11
,0 c  is either an attracting cycle or cyclic-invariant 
chaotic intervals, or a Cantor set belonging to trapping intervals bounded by critical 
points. Finally, for ( ) 31 >− cα , the generic trajectory of map (5) is divergent. 
    It is interesting to note that β  does not affect the dynamics of the map on the 
diagonal. Indeed, as can easily be ascertained by looking at the first order conditions 
(1.1) and (1.2), since both players are identical, when ( ) ( )tqtq 21 = , for every t , then 
every manager behaves as if she was not interested in the behaviour of the rival, that 
is the effects of the parameter β  on the reactions of both managers are completely 
sterilised. 
    Given the above analysis, we are now wondering about whether an attractor for the 
one-dimensional map Eq. (7) also represents an attractor for the two dimensional map 
Eq. (5). In order to study this issue, we have to investigate the transverse attractivity 
of attractors located on ∆ . Therefore, we consider the following Jacobian matrix 
associated to Eq. (5): 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 




−−+−+−
−−−+−+
=
cqqq
qcqq
qqJ
αβαααβα
βααβααα
1411
1141
,
122
111
21 , (10) 
which can be computed in a point ( )qq,  on the diagonal to obtain: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 




=
qlqm
qmql
qqJ , , (11) 
where ( ) ( )51 −+−+= βααα qcql  and ( ) ( )1−= βα qqm . The eigenvalues associated to a 
generic point on ∆  are the following: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) cqqmql αβααλ −−−+=+= 321|| , (12) 
with eigenvector ( )1,1  and 
 ( ) ( ) cqqmql αααλ −−+=−=⊥ 41 , (13) 
with eigenvector ( )1,1 − . The eigenvalue ||λ  is related to the invariant manifold ∆  and 
coincides with the multiplier of the restriction of the map on ∆ . The eigenvector 
associated with the eigenvalue ⊥λ  is always orthogonal to ∆  regardless of q . 
    At this point, by using the coordinates of ∗E  the dynamic properties around the 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium are summarised in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium ∗E  is asymptotically stable if and only 
if 
c−
<
1
2
α . For 
c−
=
1
2
α , the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ∗E  is destabilised by a 
supercritical flip bifurcation.12 
 
Proof. By the symmetry of the map it follows that eigenvalues defined by Eqs. (12) 
and (13) are real numbers (i.e., a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation cannot occur). Then, by 
substituting out the coordinates of ∗E  in the generic expression of the eigenvalues of a 
point on ∆ , we have ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 1
3
11111 **|| <
−
+−
−=<−−= ⊥ β
βαλαλ cEcE . It follows that the 
                                                 
12 We note that in this context (with a linear demand function), the Nash equilibrium cannot be 
destabilised through a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. 
L. Fanti, L. Gori, M. Sodini 
 10 
fixed point ∗E  is asymptotically stable if and only if ( )
c
E
−
<⇔−>
1
21*|| αλ . Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)               (b) 
Figure 1. (a) Case 
c−
<
1
2
α  (see Proposition 2): the Cournot-Nash equilibrium *E  is 
the unique attractor of the system (parameter values: 4=α , 575.0=β  and 51.0=c ). 
(b) Case 
c−
>
1
2
α  (see Proposition 2): the Cournot-Nash equilibrium *E  is unstable and 
a chaotic set sA  exists along the diagonal. The dynamic properties of the chaotic set sA  
will be analysed in Section 3.3 (parameter values: 4=α , 3.0=β  and 3.0=c ). Note 
that in both figures, the grey region denotes the basin of attraction of the unique finite 
distance attractor, while the white region represents the set of unfeasible trajectories. 
 
    It is important to stress that β  does not matter even on the local dynamic 
properties in the neighbourhood of *E . From an economic point of view, this implies 
that if we start from an initial condition close to the Nash equilibrium, then every 
manager does not take the behaviour of the rival into account.  
    Starting from Eqs. (12) and (13), it is possible to inquire about the stability of the 
cycles that can occur on ∆ . Indeed, for a k -cycle ( ) ( ) ( ){ }kk xxxxxx ,,...,,,, 2211  of Eq. (5), 
corresponding to cycle { }kxxx ,...,, 21  of the one-dimensional map Eq. (7), the two 
multipliers are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )cxxmxl i
k
i
ii
k
i
k αβααλ −−−+=+= ∏∏
==
321
11
|| , (14) 
with eigenvector ( )1,1 , and 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )cxxmxl i
k
i
ii
k
i
k αααλ −−+=−= ∏∏
==
⊥ 41
11
, (15) 
with eigenvector ( )1,1 − , which is independent of β . This implies that β  is a normal 
parameter (see Ashwin et al., 1996; Bischi and Gardini, 2000). The conditions for local 
stability and local bifurcations along ∆  (that is, those related to the eigenvalue ( )k||λ  
associated to the eigenvector ( )1,1 ) are those briefly listed in Proposition 1. Hence, we 
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can focus attention only to transverse stability. In particular, the problem is trivial 
when on the diagonal ∆  a cycle of finite period exists, as only the eigenvalue ( )k⊥λ  
associated to the trajectory should be evaluated in such a case. The problem becomes 
interesting when the dynamics restricted to the invariant sub-manifold are embedded 
in a chaotic set sA . In order to study this issue, we now introduce the definition of 
transverse Lyapunov exponent by which the “average” local behaviour of the 
trajectories in a neighbourhood of the invariant set ∆⊂sA  may be classified. 
 
Definition 1. Let { }0),( 0 ≥= ixfx ii  be a trajectory of Eq. (7) embedded in ∆⊂sA . Then, 
 ( ) cx
n
x
n
i
n
i
n
i
n
i
n
αααλ −−+==Λ ∑∑
=
∞→
⊥
=
∞→
⊥ 41ln
1limln1lim
11
, (16) 
is the transverse Lyapunov exponent. 
 
In particular, if 0x  belongs to a k -cycle, then ( )k⊥⊥ =Λ λln  and if 0<Λ⊥ , then the k -cycle 
is transversely stable. Otherwise if 0x  belongs to a generic aperiodic trajectory 
embedded inside the chaotic set and if 0<Λ⊥ , then such a trajectory is transversely 
stable. From the consideration above, the following classical definition of 
attractiveness can be established: 
 
Definition 2. A  is an asymptotically stable attractor (or topological attractor) if it is 
Lyapunov stable, i.e. for every neighbourhood U  of A  there exists a neighbourhood V  
of A  such that UVT n ⊂)(  for every 0≥n  and the basin of attraction )(AB  contains a 
neighbourhood of A . 
 
On the one hand, we note that the definition of an asymptotically stable attractor 
given in Definition 2, is difficult to be proved analytically, as it requires the evaluation 
of the Lyapunov exponent over an infinity of trajectories, so that it is sometimes tested 
through numerical simulations. On the other hand, it is easier to show whether a 
chaotic set along the diagonal is not an attractor in the Lyapunov sense, because it is 
sufficient to find a trajectory (for instance, a cycle) with respect to which the condition 
0<Λ⊥  is violated. 
 
3.1. Critical curves 
 
An important feature of map Eq. (5) is that it is a noninvertible endomorphism. 
Indeed, for a given ( )21,qq ′′ , the rank-1 preimage (that is, the backward iterate defined 
as 1−T ) may not exist or may be multivalued. By considering the map Eq. (5), if we 
want to compute ( )21,qq  in terms of ( )21,qq ′′ , we have to solve a fourth degree algebraic 
system that may have four, two or no solutions. Thus, we can divide the plane in 
regions 0Z , 2Z , 4Z , according to the number of preimages (where the subscript in Z  
indicates their number). A direct consequence of this fact is that, if we let ( )21,qq ′′  vary 
in the plane 2R , the number of rank-1 preimages changes as the point ( )21,qq ′′  crosses 
the boundary that separates these regions. Such boundaries are generally 
characterised by the existence of two coincident preimages. In this regard, following 
the notation used by Mira et al. (1996), we introduce the definition of critical curves. 
L. Fanti, L. Gori, M. Sodini 
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The critical curve of rank-1, denoted by LC  (from the French “Ligne Critique”), is 
defined as the locus of points with two (or more) coincident rank-1 preimages located 
on a set called 1−LC . It is quite intuitive to interpret: (i) the set LC  as the two-
dimensional generalization of the notion of critical value, defined as the value 
corresponding to either the local minimum or maximum of a one-dimensional map, 
and (ii) 1−LC  as the generalisation of the notion of critical point. Thus, arcs of LC  
separate the regions of the plane characterised by a different number of real 
preimages (see Mira et al., 1996 for details). Since the map defined by Eq. (5) is 
continuously differentiable, 1−LC  belongs to the locus of points where the Jacobian 
determinant of T  vanishes (i.e. the points where T  is not locally invertible), i.e.: 
( ){ }0)(:, 2211 =∈⊆− TDetRqqLC , and LC  is the rank-1 image of 1−LC  under T , i.e. 
( )1−= LCTLC . From direct computations, we have that: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 011115
1151614140)(
2
2
121
22
2
22
1
2
=−−+−−−+
−−−++−+−⇔=
ccq
cqqqqqTDet
ααβα
αβααβαβα
, (17) 
By studying the invariants of the previous quadratic form, it is easy to recognise that 
Eq. (17) is the equation of a hyperbola in the plane ( )21,qq . Thus, 1−LC  is formed by two 
branches, denoted by ( )aLC 1−  and 
( )bLC 1− , respectively, whose explicit equations can be 
found by using standard geometric transformation and curve parametrization (see, 
e.g., Gibson, 2003). This also implies that LC  and subsequent iterates of critical 
curves may be interpreted as the union of two different branches indexed by a  and b .  
In Figure 2, the critical curves ( )aLC 1− , 
( )bLC 1− , 
( )aLC  and ( )bLC  are depicted. Each branch 
of critical curve LC  separates the phase plane of T  into regions whose points have the 
same number of distinct rank-1 preimages. Specifically, ( )bLC  separates region 0Z  
from region 2Z , and 
( )aLC  separates region 2Z  from region 4Z . 
 
 
Figure 2. Critical curves are represented for the parameter set 4=α , 3.0=β  and 
3.0=c  (that is, the same parameters used in Figure 1.b). The yellow lines ( )aLC 1−  and 
( )bLC 1−  are the two branches of the 1−LC  set. The portion of the plane that lies between 
the axes and ( )aLC  defines region 4Z ; the portion of the plane that lies between 
( )aLC  
Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation 
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and ( )bLC  defines region 2Z ; the portion of the plane beyond 
( )bLC  defines region 0Z . 
Moreover 0E  and its preimages 
1
1
−O , 12
−O  and 13
−O  define the (grey) region of feasible 
trajectories. The region of unfeasible trajectories is white-coloured. Notice that the 
sides [ ]131111 , −−− = OOω  and [ ]131212 , −−− = OOω  are the preimages of [ ]1101 , −= OEω  and [ ]1202 , −= OEω , respectively. 
 
    The forward images of rank- k  of 1−LC  give the critical sets of rank- k , denoted by 
( ) ( )LCTLCTLC kkk 111 −−− == . Portions of critical curves of increasing rank can be used to 
obtain the boundary of absorbing and chaotic areas of non-invertible maps of the plane 
(see Mira et al., 1996 for details). We recall here some basic definitions and we refer to 
Agliari et al. (2001) for further details: 
 
Definition 3. An absorbing area A  is a bounded region of the plane whose boundary is 
given by portions of critical curves and their images of increasing order, such that a 
neighbourhood AU ⊃  exists whose points enter A  after a finite number of iterations 
and then never escape it since ( ) AAT ⊆ . 
 
Definition 4. A chaotic area is an absorbing area A  such that ( ) AAT =  and chaotic 
dynamics occurs inside A . 
 
The boundary of chaotic area A  will be shown in Figure 5.b and it is obtained by 
following the procedure described by Mira et al. (1996) and Bischi and Gardini (1998). 
First, we take subsequent images of the two segments of 1−LC  included in A  until a 
chaotic area is defined. Then, we repeat the procedure by taking only the images of 
i
i LCA 1−∩=γ , { }bai ,=  (this last step shows that the union of the first four iterates of iγ  
covers the whole boundary of chaotic area A , and this ensures that such a selected 
area is invariant, i.e. ( ) AAT = ). 
 
3.2. Basins of attraction 
 
In defining the economic problem in Section 2, we have assumed as a natural 
condition to study map T  defined by Eq. (5) on the positive orthant of 2R . However, it 
is important to note that the map generates unbounded (economically not feasible) 
trajectories if the initial condition for the dynamic system of Eq. (5) is taken with at 
least a negative coordinate or far enough from the origin, i.e., it is taken in a suitable 
neighbourhood of ∞  (which is always an attractor of the system). In fact, if we take 
fairly high values of the initial conditions of 1q  and 2q , then the first iterate of the map 
defined by Eq. (5) gives negative values of 1q  and 2q  so that the subsequent iterates 
give negative and decreasing values as well. This implies that any attractor at finite 
distance cannot be globally attracting in 2R . It follows that an important feature 
related to the study of such a model is the delimitation of the feasible set. Following 
Bischi et al. (1998), it is possible to show that coordinate axes and their preimages of 
any rank form the boundary of the feasible set. As regards the case under scrutiny, we 
note that the dynamics of the map restricted to one of the axis is governed by the 
following one-dimensional system: 
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 ( )cqqqq iiii −−+=′ 21α . (18) 
This map is conjugate to the logistic map (see Devaney, 1989) by means of the linear 
transformation ( )c−+= 11: αµ , ( )
i
i
z
cq
α
α
2
11 −+
= . Bounded trajectories along the 
invariant axes are obtained when ( ) 311 <−< cα  provided that the initial value of the 
map lies on the segments 
 [ ]1, −= ii OOω , (19) 
where 1−iO  is the rank-1 preimage of the origin on the corresponding axis with non-null 
coordinate equals 
( )
α
α
2
11 c−+
. Instead, negatively divergent trajectories along the 
invariant axis are obtained starting from an initial condition out of the segment. 
Furthermore, from the computation of the eigenvalues of the cycles that belong to iω  
we have that the direction transverse to the coordinate axes is always repelling. From 
these arguments, it follows that iω  belongs to ( )∞∂B  as well as to their preimages of 
any rank. Now, by following Bischi et al. (1998), the next proposition gives an exact 
delimitation of ( )∞∂B . 
 
Proposition 3. Let ( ) 310 <−< cα  and iω , { }2,1=i  be the segment lines defined in Eq. 
(19). Then, 
 ( ) ( )





∪∪





∪=∞∂ −
+∞
=
−
+∞
=
2010
)( ωω n
n
n
n
TTB . (20) 
 
Proof. We refer to Bischi et al. (1998) for analytical details of the proof. 
 
In contrast to Bischi et al. (1998), however, for all the parameter sets that we have 
taken into account, the segments 1−iω  lie on region 0Z , so that the boundary of the 
basin of attraction is exactly made up by 1−∪ ii ωω , { }2,1=i  (see Figure 2). 
 
3.3. Intermittency, synchronisation and blow-out 
 
In the first part of Section 3 we have analysed simple dynamic events where a fixed 
point, a cycle, or a chaotic attractor on the diagonal is the unique attractor of the 
dynamic system, which, according to the definition of deterministic chaos by Li and 
Yorke (1975), captures almost all non-diverging orbits. 
    In this section we show that the dynamics of our simple model present more 
interesting and complicated phenomena. From an economic point of view, one of the 
most important result is given by the fact that even if the structure the economy is 
characterised by symmetric homogeneous players (managers), we observe coordination 
failure when (in the case of competition between managers) the size β  increases and 
the intensity of competition becomes higher. 
    We note that in the standard Cournot model with no strategic delegation ( 0=β ), 
linear demand and cost functions, and homogeneous players, Bischi et al. (1998) have 
shown that, starting from initial conditions ( )0iq  of output outside the diagonal, 
coordination failure may occur only along the transient (even if sometimes the 
synchronisation process may take a very long time). This is the case of the 
Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation 
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phenomenon known as on-off intermittency. Departing from the standard Cournot 
model and introducing strategic delegation, we can have collusion ( 01 <<− β ) or 
competition ( 10 << β ) between managers. Then, situations characterised by 
coordination failure along the transient (on-off intermittency) are sterilised when 
collusion between managers exists and the intensity of such a collusion is strong 
enough. In contrast, in the case of competition between managers we note that: (i) 
coordination failure phenomena are observed only along the transient (on-off 
intermittency), as in the basic model ( 0=β ), see Bischi et al. (1998), or (ii) 
coordination failure phenomena become persistent (blow-out and multistability). It is 
important to stress that blow-out and multistability are indeed usually observed: in 
models where players are heterogeneous (for instance, because of the existence of 
asymmetric production costs), or in models the mathematical structure presents 
strong nonlinearities as, e.g., in the works by Bischi and Gardini (2000), Kopel et al. 
(2000), and Bischi and Kopel (2003), where the dynamic system is described by maps 
with denominators. 
    Now, in order to make the subsequent analysis clearer and self-contained, we now 
recall both definitions and properties that allow us to describe and characterise the 
dynamics of our model. We start by noting that the study of dynamic systems with 
chaotic trajectories embedded into an invariant sub manifold of lower dimensionality 
than the total phase space, have recently captured attention of researchers (see, e.g., 
Mosekilde et al., 2002 for a survey on the subject). Moreover, the analysis of how 
synchronised attractors and their basins of attraction undergo qualitative changes 
when some basic parameters vary has also been taken into account. Of particular 
importance in the study of these phenomena is the use of the Lyapunov exponent (see, 
e.g., Bischi et al., 1998; Maistrenko et al., 1998; Bischi and Gardini, 2000). 
    Consistently with these arguments, we now take the analysis of our Cournot model 
with relative performance into account, and concentrate on the case under which a 
chaotic set sA  exists on the diagonal (that is, when ( ) 57.21 >− cα ). Then, we let β  vary 
and study the dynamic properties of the map. First, we observe that in the case of 
collusion between managers with β  sufficiently high, there exists numerical evidence 
such that the diagonal is Lyapunov stable: given any initial condition ( )0iq  of output 
within the quadrilateral of vertices 12
1
3
1
1
−−− OOOO , as defined in Figure 2, this means that 
after a few iterations both managers coordinate their behaviours on the diagonal. 
Then, moving from negative to positive values of β , we find that a threshold value 
Μ= ββ  exists (whose size depends on the other parameters of the model), beyond 
which the dynamic behaviour of the system markedly modifies. Since a chaotic set ∆  
on the main diagonal exists in such a case, it follows that infinitely many cycles, all 
unstable along ( )1,1  are embedded inside the chaotic set sA . This implies that this 
object cannot be classified as an attractor in the Lyapunov sense. This type of loss of 
stability, however, may not be recognised by looking at Figure 1.b, because in the long 
run all feasible trajectories synchronise on the diagonal in such a case. 
    Now, in order to distinguish and classify the dynamic phenomena that can be 
observed for Μ> ββ , it is useful to define a spectrum of transverse Lyapunov 
exponents 
 maxmin ....... ⊥⊥⊥ <<<< λλλ nat , (21) 
each of which is associated with a specific trajectory, where nat⊥λ  is the Lyapunov 
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exponent evaluated on a generic trajectory taken in the chaotic attractor. Roughly 
speaking, nat⊥λ  may be interpreted as a sort of “weighted balance” amongst the 
Lyapunov exponents associated to different cycles. Now, if a set is a Lyapunov 
attractor, it follows that 0max <⊥λ  (see Definition 2) and also 0<⊥natλ . Notwithstanding, 
by considering positive values of β  beyond Μβ , it is possible to find that some cycles 
embedded in chaotic set sA  become transversely unstable. This implies that the 
transverse multiplier is 0max >⊥λ , while nat⊥λ  is still negative (see Maistrenko et al., 
1998; Bischi and Gardini, 2000). In this case, sA  is no longer Lyapunov stable, but it 
continues to attract a positive (Lebesgue) measure set of points of the two dimensional 
phase space. If the set sA  has the property to attract a positive (Lebesgue) measure set 
of points of the two dimensional phase space, it is said to be weak stable or stable in 
Milnor sense. To this purpose, Figure 1.b has already shown this phenomenon for a 
positive value of β : a generic trajectory that starts in the grey region is attracted by 
the one-dimensional Milnor attractor on the diagonal. 
 
 
Figure 3. Natural transverse Lyapunov exponent nat⊥λ  as a function of β  belonging to 
the interval [ ]7.0,1.0−  (parameter set: 4.0=α  and 3.0=c ). The figure is obtained by 
dividing the interval [ ]7.0,1.0−  into 1000  equidistant points. Starting from a generic 
initial condition on the diagonal, each point has been iterated 10000  times through 
map T  (to eliminate the transient), and then averaging over subsequent 50000  
iterations. 
 
In the numerical example illustrated in Figures 4.a and 4.b no other attractors than 
sA  exist, so that trajectories are first move away from the main diagonal and then they 
approach towards sA , and the dynamics are characterised by some bursts away from 
∆  before synchronising on it (on-off intermittency). The synchronisation takes a very 
long time because nat⊥λ  is negative but close to zero. 
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                  (a)         (b) 
Figure 4. Parameter values: 4.0=α , 3.0=c  and 556.0=β . (a) The figure shows a 
typical trajectory that starts in the basin of attraction of the finite distance (Milnor) 
attractor. (b) The figure shows the phenomenon of intermittency by displaying the 
difference between 1q  and 2q  versus time: the convergence towards the unique chaotic 
(Milnor) attractor of the system embedded in the diagonal occurs only after a very long 
transient. 
 
If we let β  increase (ceteris paribus), also nat⊥λ  becomes positive due to the fact that 
the transversely unstable periodic orbits embedded in sA  weights more than the 
transversely attracting ones (see Figures 5.a and 5.b). In this case, sA  becomes a 
chaotic saddle and we observe an explosion of the attractor which is now no more 
confined on the diagonal, the so-called blow-out bifurcation occurs and a two 
dimensional attractor is observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)         (b) 
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Figure 5. Parameter values: 4.0=α , 3.0=c  and 6.0=β . (a) The figure shows the 
effect of a rise in β  on the long run dynamics: the one dimensional Milnor attractor, 
as shown in Figure 1.b for 3.0=β  and in Figure 4.a for 556.0=β , has been replaced by 
a two dimensional attractor. (b) Boundary of the chaotic area (simulated in Figure 5a) 
obtained by arcs of the critical curves LC , 1LC , 2LC  and 3LC . 
 
In this case we can talk about coordination failure or symmetry-breaking of the 
dynamics. We note that even if the long-run dynamics are no more restricted on the 
diagonal, by using the critical curves and their iterates we may delimitate the borders 
of the phase plane in which the asymptotic dynamics are bounded. It is important to 
note that the same technique may also be applied to give an upper bound to the 
transient trajectories of the map when intermittency occurs. 
 
3.4 Multistability and related basins of attraction 
 
A dramatic change in the long run dynamics is observed if we take different parameter 
sets and let beta vary. In particular, by assuming 8.3=α  and 3.0=c  we observe some 
interesting events which are detailed below when β  belongs to the interval 
[ ]5379.0,165.0 . In this case, we have the birth (through local bifurcations) of new 
stable equilibria outside the diagonal. This phenomenon is tangled in several ways 
with the set sA . In the following numerical experiment, it is possible to observe an 
example of the phenomenon known as riddled basins. The set sA  is a Milnor attractor 
and it is characterised by 0>⊥
natλ , as in Section 3.3: but with this parameter set 
several trajectories move away from the diagonal and approach another attractor. 
    In Figure 6.a ( 45.0=β ) we note that a four-period cycle exists together with the 
diagonal. If β  increases, the cycle undergoes a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation and an 
attractor formed by four smooth curves coexists with the diagonal (see Figure 6.b, 
where 46.0=β ). Further increases in β  first cause the loss of smoothness of the 
attractor formed by four curves (see Figure 6.c, where 485.0=β ), and then cause the 
birth of a four-piece chaotic attractor (see Figure 6.d, where 53.0=β ). 
    The subsequent basin boundary (final) bifurcation for 5379.0≅β  causes the death of 
the attractor and only the two-piece Milnor attractor exists as the unique attractor of 
the system in such a case (we note that this phenomenon is not reported in any 
figures). 
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(a)             (b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)            (d) 
Figure 6. Parameter values: 8.3=α  and 3.0=c . (a) For 45.0=β , an attracting four-
period cycle exists together with the two-piece Milnor attractor on the diagonal. (b) For 
46.0=β , the four-period cycle has undergone a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation and an 
attractor formed by four smooth curves exist together with the two-piece Milnor 
attractor. (c) For 485.0=β , the attractor formed by the four smooth curves has become 
non-smooth. (d) For 53.0=β , a four-piece chaotic attractor exists outside the diagonal. 
 
    Other interesting phenomena can be observed by slightly changing the basic 
parameters of the model. In particular, multistability occurs even if along the diagonal 
an attractive set does not exist. We start by fixing 9.3=α  and 32.0=c . Then, in order 
to properly shows this phenomenon we choose the following two fairly high values of 
β : 987.0=β  and 97.0=β . In the former case ( 987.0=β ), two chaotic two-piece 
attractors exist whose basins of attraction are separated by some invariant manifolds 
associated to the unstable cycles. This can be seen by looking at Figure 7.a, where the 
dark-grey (light-grey) region denotes the basin of attraction of the black-coloured (red-
coloured) chaotic attractor). A more complicated structure of the basins of attraction is 
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obtained by slightly reducing the parameter β , i.e. 97.0=β  (see Figure 7.b). Indeed, 
by looking at Figure 7.b, we can now observe new portions of the basin of attraction of 
the black-coloured chaotic attractor embedded in the basin of attraction of the red-
coloured chaotic attractor. We now make use of critical curves in order to explain such 
a phenomenon. In Figure 7.c, an enlargement of Figure 7.b is presented where it is 
shown that a global bifurcation of the basins of attraction is just occurred. Indeed, 
starting from high values, we can observe that a reduction in beta causes an 
enlargement of the distance between the two critical curves )(aLC  and )(bLC , so that 
the branches of rank-1 critical curve )(bLC , which separates 0Z  from 2Z , move towards 
the regions denoted by 1P  and 2P  in Figure 7.a. This implies that a threshold value of 
β  ( Tβ ) does exist such that a tangency between )(bLC  and the boundary of 1P  and 2P  
occurs simultaneously, and this last property is due to the symmetry of the map. Then, 
as evidenced in Figures 7.b and 7.c (which is an enlargement of Figure 7.b referred to 
the region around 1P  only), a portion of 1P  and 2P  (labelled as H  in Figure 7.c) enters 
the 2Z  area. Since 1P  and 2P  belong to the basin of attraction of the black-coloured 
attractor, then also their preimages belong to such a basin. This creates infinitely 
many dark-grey lakes (see Mira et al., 1996) embedded in the light-grey region inside 
the quadrilateral of vertices 12
1
3
1
1
−−− OOOO . In particular, after the bifurcation (tangency) 
two main lakes lie inside 4Z . Hence, both have further preimages which form lakes of 
smaller dimension within the light-grey region. These lakes lie inside the 
quadrilateral in the region complementary to 0Z . This phenomenon is iterated 
indefinitely (see Mira et al., 1996 for an analysis and deep discussion of this type of 
basin bifurcation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    (a)          (b) 
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(c) 
Figure 7. Parameter values: 9.3=α  and 32.0=c  (a) For 987.0=β , we observe the 
coexistence of two chaotic attractors, black-coloured and red-coloured, whose basins of 
attraction are represented by the dark-grey region and the light-grey region, 
respectively. (b) For 97.0=β , a global bifurcation is just occurred and infinitely many 
dark-grey lakes embedded in the light-grey region are born. In both Figures 7.a and 
7.b also the critical curves )(aLC  and )(bLC , which separate the zones with number of 
preimages, are depicted. (c) An enlargement view of Figure 7.b., showing a portion of 
the phase plane after the tangency between )(bLC  and the boundary of 1P  and 2P  has 
occurred. The birth of the region between )(bLC  and the boundary of 1P  (denoted by H ) 
is also shown. 
 
    It is also important to note that in this model multistability can be recognised not 
only when there are chaotic attractors, but also when several distinct attractors (with 
their corresponding basins of attraction) are in existence. In order to show this 
behaviour of map T , the parameter set is slightly changed to 2.4=α  and 39.0=c . 
Then we let β  reduce from 1 (see Figure 8.a), even if this case is not economically 
feasible because profits of both firms are zero in such a case, to 98.0  (see Figure 8.b). 
Indeed, by fixing 1=β , map T  (see Eq. 5) collapses to: 
 ( ) [ ][ ]

−−+=′
−−+=′
=
cqqqq
cqqqq
qqTT
2222
1111
21 21
21
:,
α
α
. (22) 
Eq. (22) is topologically conjugated to the double logistic map whose properties have 
been studied by, e.g., Shin (2003), where, in particular, the global pattern of the basins 
of attraction of the map is classified. We recall that Eq. (22) describes a totally 
uncoupled map, that is ( )ii qfq =′ , with { }2,1=i . 
    Then, for 1=β  we observe that six attractors exist and their basins of attraction are 
composed of an infinite number of rectangles. This result persists if we let β  decrease 
to an economically feasible value ( 98.0=β ). It is also interesting to note that in this 
latter case: (i) non-synchronised attractors exist along the diagonal, and (ii) some of 
the attractors have undergone local bifurcations. 
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      (a)                 (b) 
Figure 8. Parameter values: 2.4=α  and 39.0=c . (a) For 1=β , we observe a plethora 
of attractors with the corresponding basins of attractions. In particular, a four-period 
cycle exists on the diagonal. (b) For 98.0=β , several attractors have undergone to 
local bifurcations. No attractors exist anymore on the diagonal. Perhaps, some of the 
attractors are chaotic. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper originated from a twofold reason: on the one hand, the increasing interest 
for a refined analysis of the burgeoning dynamic oligopoly literature (e.g., Tramontana 
et al., 2009; Bischi et al., 2010); on the other hand, the importance, emphasised by 
both the theoretical and empirical literatures (e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Miller 
and Pazgal, 2002) of compensation practices to managers based on sales, market share 
and relative profit delegation schemes, has raised an established literature that 
extends the standard oligopoly (static) model with profit-maximising firms by 
including managerial incentive contracts (e.g., Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Miller and 
Pazgal, 2002; Jansen et al., 2009). The novelty of the present paper is the introduction 
of managerial incentive contracts, based on relative performance evaluations, in a 
dynamic duopoly game with quantity competition and homogeneous players. 
    While the existing literature à la VFJS clarified the ranking between equilibrium 
outcomes in models with sales delegation, market share delegation and relative 
performance evaluations (and compared them with the outcome of the standard 
Cournot model with profit-maximising firms), we showed that the existence of 
managerial delegation with relative profit schemes may cause interesting local and 
global dynamic events when either the degree of competition or collusion between 
managers becomes higher. In particular, when the basic parameter of the model are 
such that a chaotic set exists on the diagonal, the collusion between managers may 
favour synchronisation of the dynamics in a few iterations. In contrast, when 
competition exists we observe a dramatic change in the dynamic events, because 
Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation 
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relevant phenomena such as on-off intermittency, blow out phenomena and 
multistability are more likely to occur. This means that competition between 
managers induces a lack of coordination which is the main cause of all these dynamic 
phenomena that are usually observed when players are heterogeneous (Bischi et al., 
1998; 1999). 
    This paper can be extended in several directions, for instance by introducing 
managerial delegation contracts in dynamic duopoly games with quantity competition 
and isoelastic demand functions, or in dynamic duopoly games with price competition 
and horizontal and/or vertical differentiation between products. 
 
References 
 
    Aggarwal R.K., Samwick, A.A., 1999. Executive compensation, strategic competition 
and relative performance evaluation: theory and evidence. Journal of Finance 54, 
1999–2043. 
    Agiza, H.N., 1999. On the analysis of stability, bifurcation, chaos and chaos control 
of Kopel map. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 10, 1909–1916. 
    Agiza, H.N., Elsadany, A.A., 2003. Nonlinear dynamics in the Cournot duopoly 
game with heterogeneous players. Physica A 320, 512–524. 
    Agiza, H.N., Elsadany, A.A., 2004. Chaotic dynamics in nonlinear duopoly game 
with heterogeneous players. Applied Mathematics and Computation 149, 843–860. 
    Agliari, A., Bischi, G.I., Gardini, L., 2002. Some methods for the global analysis of 
dynamic games represented by iterated noninvertible maps. In: Puu, T., Sushko, I., 
Eds., Oligopoly Dynamics. Models and Tools, Ch. 3, 31–84. Berlin Heidelberg: 
Springer-Verlag. 
    Agliari, A., Gardini, L., Puu, T., 2005. Some global bifurcations related to the 
appearance of closed invariant curves. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation 68, 
201–219. 
    Agliari, A., Chiarella, C., Gardini, L., 2006. A re-evaluation of adaptive expectations 
in light of global nonlinear dynamic analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 60, 526–552. 
    Agliari, A., Gardini, L., Puu, T., 2006. Global bifurcations in duopoly when the 
Cournot point is destabilized via a subcritical Neimark bifurcation. International 
Game Theory Review 8, 1–20. 
    Ashwin, P., Buescu, J., Stewart, I., 1996. From attractor to chaotic saddle: a tale of 
transverse instability. Nonlinearity 9, 703–737. 
    Baumol, W., 1958. On the theory of oligopoly. Economica 25, 187–198. 
    Bischi, G.I., Gardini, L., 1998. Role of invariant and minimal absorbing areas in 
chaos synchronization. Physical Review E 58, 5710–5719. 
    Bischi, G.I., Gardini, L., 2000. Global properties of symmetric competition models 
with riddling and blowout phenomena. Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 5, 
149–160. 
    Bischi, G.I., Kopel, M., 2001. Equilibrium selection in a nonlinear duopoly game 
with adaptive expectations. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46, 73–
100. 
    Bischi, G.I., Kopel, M., 2003. Multistability and path dependence in a dynamic 
brand competition model. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 18, 561–576. 
L. Fanti, L. Gori, M. Sodini 
 24 
    Bischi, G.I., Naimzada, A., 2000. Global analysis of a dynamic duopoly game with 
bounded rationality. In: Filar, J.A., Gaitsgory, V., Mizukami, K., Eds., Advances in 
Dynamics Games and Application, Vol. 5., 361–385. Boston: Birkhäuser. 
    Bischi, G.I., Gallegati, M., Naimzada, A., 1999. Symmetry-breaking bifurcations and 
representative firm in dynamic duopoly games. Annals of Operations Research 89, 
253–272. 
    Bischi, G.I., Mammana, C., Gardini, L., 2000. Multistability and cyclic attractors in 
duopoly games. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 11, 543–564. 
    Bischi, G.I., Stefanini, L., Gardini, L., 1998. Synchronization, intermittency and 
critical curves in duopoly games. Mathematics and Computers in Simulations 44, 559–
585. 
    Bischi, G.I., Chiarella, C., Kopel, M., Szidarovszky, F., 2010. Nonlinear Oligopolies. 
Stability and Bifurcations. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
    Burmeister, E., 1980. On some conceptual issues in rational expectations modelling. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 12, 217–228. 
    Chiarella, C., 1986. Perfect foresight models and the dynamic instability problem 
from a higher viewpoint. Economic Modelling 3, 283–292. 
    Chiarella, C., 1990. The Elements of a Nonlinear Theory of Economic Dynamics. 
Berlin: Springer Verlag. 
    Correa-López, M., Naylor, R.A., 2004. The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: a 
reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining. European Economic 
Review 48, 681–696. 
    Cournot, A., 1838. Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des 
Richessess. Paris: Hachette. 
    Cyert, R.M., DeGroot, M.H., 1973. An analysis of cooperation and learning in a 
duopoly context. American Economic Review 63, 24–37. 
    Devaney, R.L., 1989. An Introduction to Chaotic Dynamical Systems. Second 
Edition. Redwood City (CA): Addison-Wesley. 
    Dixit, A.K., 1986. Comparative statics for oligopoly. International Economic Review 
27, 107–122. 
    Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of 
Law and Economics 26, 301–325. 
    Fanti, L., Gori, L., 2012. The dynamics of a differentiated duopoly with quantity 
competition. Economic Modelling 29, 421–427. 
    Fershtman, C., 1985. Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic 
environment. International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, 245–253. 
    Fershtman, C., Judd, K., 1987. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. American 
Economic Review 77, 927–940. 
    Gibbons, R., Murphy, K.J., 1990. Relative performance evaluation for chief 
executive officers. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, 30–51. 
    Gibson, C.G., 2003. Elementary Euclidean Geometry. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
    Grossman, S.J., Stiglitz, J.E., 1977. On value maximization and alternative 
objectives of the firm. Journal of Finance 32, 389–402. 
    Jansen, T., Lier, A. van, Witteloostuijn, A. van, 2007. A note on strategic delegation: 
the market share case. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25, 531–539. 
    Jansen, T., Lier A. van, Witteloostuijn, A. van, 2009. On the impact of managerial 
bonus systems on firm profit and market competition: the cases of pure profit, sales, 
Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation 
 25 
market share and relative profits compared. Managerial and Decision Economics 30, 
141–153. 
    Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J., 1990. Performance pay and top management 
incentives. Journal of Political Economy 98, 225–264. 
    Kopel, M., 1996. Simple and complex adjustment dynamics in Cournot duopoly 
models. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 12, 2031–2048. 
    Kopel, M., Szidarovszky, F., 2006. Resource dynamics under partial cooperation in 
an oligopoly. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 128, 393–410. 
    Kopel, M., Bischi, G.I., Gardini, L., 2000. On new phenomena in dynamic 
promotional competition models with homogeneous and quasi-homogeneous firms. In: 
Delli Gatti, D., Gallegati, M., Kirman, A.P., Eds., Interaction and Market Structure. 
Essays on Heterogeneity in Economics, 57–87. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
    Li, T.Y., Yorke, J.A., 1975. Period three implies chaos. American Mathematical 
Monthly 82, 985–992. 
    Lucas, R.E., Jr., 1972. Expectations and the neutrality of money. Journal of 
Economic Theory 4, 103–124. 
    Maistrenko, Y.L., Maistrenko, V.L., Popovich, A., Mosekilde, E., 1998. Transverse 
instability and riddled basins in a system of two coupled logistic maps. Physical 
Review E 57, 2713–2724. 
    Miller, N., Pazgal, A., 2002. Relative performance as a strategic commitment 
mechanism. Managerial and Decision Economics 23, 51–68. 
    Mira, C., Gardini, L., Barugola, A., Cathala, J.C., 1996. Chaotic Dynamics in Two-
Dimensional Noninvertible Maps. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. 
    Mosekilde, E., Maistrenko, Y.L., Postnov, D., 2002. Chaos Synchronization. 
Application to Living Systems. Singapore: World Scientific. 
    Muth, J.F., 1961. Rational expectations and the theory of price movements. 
Econometrica 29, 315–335. 
    Naimzada, A.K., Tramontana, F., 2010. A dynamic model of a boundedly rational 
consumer with a simple least squared learning mechanism. Computational Economics 
36, 47–56. 
    Puu, T., 1991. Chaos in duopoly pricing. Chaos, Solitons and Fractals 1, 573–581. 
    Puu, T., 1998. The chaotic duopolists revisited. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 33, 385–394. 
    Salas Fumas, V., 1992. Relative performance evaluation of management: the effects 
on industrial competition and rick sharing. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 10, 473–489. 
    Sargent, T.J., 1993. Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics. New York (NY): 
Oxford University Press. 
    Sargent, T.J., Wallace, N., 1973. The stability of models of money and growth with 
perfect foresight. Econometrica 41, 1043–1048. 
    Shin, G.S., 2003. Interwoven basin structures of double logistic map at the edge of 
chaos. Working Paper http://arxiv.org/abs/nlin/0303028. 
    Simon, H., 1957. Simon, Herbert (1957). A behavioral model of rational choice. In: 
Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human 
Behavior in a Social Setting. New York (NY): Wiley. 
    Sklivas, S., 1987. The strategic choice of managerial incentives. RAND Journal of 
Economics 18, 452–458. 
L. Fanti, L. Gori, M. Sodini 
 26 
    Theocharis R.D. 1960. On the stability of the Cournot solution on the oligopoly 
problem. Review of Economic Studies 27, 133–134. 
    Tramontana, F., 2010. Heterogeneous duopoly with isoelastic demand function. 
Economic Modelling 27, 350–357. 
    Tramontana, F., Gardini, L., Puu, T., 2009. Cournot duopoly when the competitors 
operate multiple production plants. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, 
250–265. 
    Vickers, J., 1985. Delegation and the theory of the firm. Economic Journal 95, 138–
147. 
    Witteloostuijn, A. van, Jansen, T., Lier, A. van, 2007. Bargaining over managerial 
contracts in delegation games: managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel 
behavior. Managerial and Decision Economics 28, 897–904. 
    Zhang, J., Da, Q., Wang, Y., 2007. Analysis of nonlinear duopoly game with 
heterogeneous players. Economic Modelling 24, 138–148. 
